We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information.
Introduction
This paper provides identification results for both single-agent discrete choice bundle models and binary games of complete information. We establish a tight connection between these models from the perspective of algebraic arguments for identification and further show that the models are indeed mathematically equivalent when attention is restricted to the class of potential games under a specific equilibrium selection rule. This equivalence result allows researchers to extrapolate any further identification progress in one of these models to the other.
We focus on the case of two goods and two players and extend the analysis to the case of three or more goods and players in the online appendix. The approach we provide is nonparametric and allows us to recover the payoff relevant functions, the distribution of heterogeneous interaction effects, and the distribution of good-or player-specific unobservables. These structural features of the models are needed to make counterfactual predictions that do not directly derive from choice data. In the single-agent choice model, our results allow us, for example, to forecast purchasing decisions for bundle discounts that were not previously offered. In the case of games, we can point identify (under an assumed equilibrium selection rule) or set identify (without an equilibrium selection rule) equilibrium choices under different processes for matching players.
Our identification strategy crucially relies on exclusion restrictions. In the single-agent choice model, each excluded variable enters the standalone payoff of a single good additively. For games, each excluded variable similarly affects the standalone payoff of one player but not the payoff of the other player. We do not impose exclusion restrictions either for a bundle or for players' joint action profiles. The excluded variables play a dual role: identifying the sign of the interaction effects as well as the joint distribution of the unobservables. Indeed, we show in the online appendix, via a simple example, that the joint distribution of unobservables cannot be uniquely recovered without the excluded variables, at least in our general formulation of the model. These results clarify the critical, if not surprising, need for choice-specific exclusion restrictions, something that has been exploited in some applications (e.g., Liu, Chintagunta, and Zhu 2010) but is absent in others (e.g., Kretschmer, Miravete and Pernias 2012 and Hartman 2010) .
For the bundles model, applying previous results on nonparametric identification requires treating the bundle as just another option in a multinomial choice model (Thompson 1989 , Matzkin 1993 , Lewbel 2000 . For two goods, this amounts to having three exclusion restrictions: one variable that shifts standalone payoffs for each binary choice variable and another one that shifts the payoffs of the bundle itself (Athey and Stern 1998). Our identification results only require exclusion restrictions at the level of the two binary variables. We allow for correlation in the unobservable components of the standalone payoffs and unobserved heterogeneity in the magnitude of the interaction effect. Our nonparametric results follow empirical papers that have estimated parametric bundles models while recognizing the intuitive gain in identification from exclusion restrictions, such as Gentzkow (2007a). Sher and Kim (2014) establish a weak identification concept for a bundles model without data on the market shares of bundles.
There is a growing literature on the semi or nonparametric identification of two-player binary games of complete information, without restricting the equilibrium selection rule. The basic result is Berry and Tamer (2006, Result 4) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009, Theorem 2) . 1 We show that their algebraic steps in identification proofs are very closely linked to the ones for the bundles model. We further show the proofs are identical for the case of potential games with the equilibrium selection rule based on potential maximizers. In addition, without imposing an equilibrium selection rule, we identify the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in the interaction effects, which is not present in either of these two papers. In an entry game, we allow the reduction in profits from monopoly to duopoly to vary across observationally identical markets. Allowing heterogeneous interaction effects also appeared in simultaneously circulated papers by Kline (2015) and Dunker, Hoderlein and Kaido (2013). Berry and Tamer (2006, Result 4) and subsequent papers assume the researcher knows the sign of the interaction effects: the game is known to be either of strategic substitutes or complements. Imposing the structure of potential games and its associated equilibrium selection rule, we exploit the equivalence to the bundles model to identify the sign of the interaction effect. This result is useful in models where offsetting effects mean that the sign is hard to anticipate (for example, the crimes model of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2006).
The online appendix includes results for the case of three or more goods and players that do not closely extend the cited papers. We do not present a nonparametric or a semiparametric estimator; sieve maximum likelihood is one alternative (Chen, Tamer and Torgovitsky 2011). All proofs are in the appendix.
Model of Bundles and Games

Identification Results for a General Model
An agent chooses the values of two binary variables a = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} in order to maximize
where Z i ∈ R only affects the utility associated to the binary variable i, W ∈ R k is a vector of explanatory variables different from Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 ), and (ε, η) = (ε 1 , ε 2 , η) ∈ R 3 is a vector that captures heterogeneous effects with distribution F ε,η|W,Z . The vector (ε, η) is observed by the agent but not by the econometrician. In expression (1), the utility of selecting a = (0, 0) is normalized to zero. The term u i (W ) + Z i + ε i is the standalone utility of assigning value 1 only to binary variable i, a i = 1 and a −i = 0.
2 Finally, the utility of assigning value 1 to both binary variables, a = (1, 1), is the sum of the standalone utilities plus the interaction term η · v (W ). For each W = w, the binary variables are complements if η ·v (w) ≥ 0 and substitutes otherwise. 3 We assume η∈ R + , so that η modifies the magnitude but not the sign of the interaction effect, which therefore is given by the sign of v (W ). 4 The pair ε 1 , ε 2 captures heterogeneity or idiosyncratic shocks at the level of each binary variable, and η reflects heterogeneity at the bundle level. We use data on i.i.d. chosen actions and explanatory variables (a, w, z) to identify aspects of the unknown functions u 1 (W ) , u 2 (W ) , ν (W ) , F ε,η|W,Z . Our model is nonparametric as the objects of interest are arbitrary, possibly discontinuous, functions of W .
5 Note that i.i.d.
sampling allows us to nonparametrically identify the conditional choice probabilities Pr (a | w, z) with no further assumptions. Our results rely on the next restrictions.
2 Z i enters the utility with a positive sign. We can identify the sign of Z i by seeing whether the marginal probability of selecting variable i increases with Z i . If the sign of Z i should be negative, redefine Z i appropriately.
3 When applied to the bundles model, Gentzkow (2007b) shows that this definition of complements and substitutes is equivalent to the usual definitions based on price responses. 4 We let η > 0 instead of η ≥ 0 because η = 0 is made redundant by the possibility that v (W ) = 0. If we had an additive η + v (W ), under similar assumptions to ours we could identify the distribution of η as long as the support of η ensures that η + v (W ) always has the same sign conditional on W . Likewise, say η has two components, η a and η b where the total interaction effect is η a + η b · v (W ). We could identify v (W ) if we similarly restrict the support of η a so that η a + η b · v (W ) always has the same sign conditional on W and we also assume E [η a | W ] = 0 and E [η b | W ] = 1. 5 We do not explore the case where W instead multiplies random coefficients, as in the follow-on work of Dunker, Hoderlein and Kaido (2014).
A3: ε | W has an everywhere positive Lebesgue density on its support.
The exclusion restrictions, captured by Z 1 and Z 2 , play a dual role in our analysis: They are key to identifying the sign of the interaction effects, as reflected in the proof of Lemma 1 below. They are also needed to recover the joint distribution of unobservables, as captured by the non-identification result in Section C of the online appendix.
The large support restriction, A1, is a common requirement used in various ways in the literature on binary and multinomial choice models.
6 It allows us to recover the tails of the distribution of unobservables F ε,η|W without restricting its support; we show below that with mild changes we can still identify part of the model structure without A1. The independence assumption A2(i) allows us to trace F ε,η|W using variation in Z. Assumptions A2(ii) and A2(iii) provide location normalizations for ε and η and rule out omitted variable bias from W in identifying (u 1 (·) , u 2 (·) , ν (·)); (ε, η) can be heteroskedastic with respect to W .
7 Assumption A3 gives probability zero to tie events.
Our main result requires initial identification of the sign of the interaction effect. The proof of Lemma 1 builds on monotone comparative statics methods for stochastic models and crucially relies on the excluded variables Z 1 , Z 2 . The intuition for the identification of the sign of the interaction effect is simple. When the interaction effect is positive, the probability of selecting a 1 = 1 increases with the value of the excluded explanatory variable Z 2 , as the latter makes alternative 2 more valuable. Because the opposite holds when the interaction effect is negative, whether the alternatives are complements or substitutes can be inferred from the data. Using Lemma 1, the following theorem states our identification result.
If, in addition, η and ε are independent conditional on W = w, then F ε|w and F η|w are identified. 6 See, e.g., Manski (1975 Manski ( , 1985 Manski ( , 1988 , Thompson (1989) , Matzkin (1992 Matzkin ( , 1993 Matzkin ( , 2007 , Ichimura and Thompson (1998) , Lewbel (1998 Lewbel ( , 2000 , Berry and Haile (2010), Fox and Gandhi (2016) , and Chen et. al (forthcoming).
7 If E (ε | W ) and E (η | W ) are non-constant functions of W = w, the values of u 1 (W ), u 2 (W ) and v (W ) produced by the proof strategy of Theorem 1 below will suffer from omitted variable bias. If, in this case, E (ε | T ) = (0, 0) and E (η | T ) = 1 for some "instruments" T , one could correctly identify u 1 (W ), u 2 (W ) and v (W ) under additional assumptions on (T, W ) and a slight modification of the proof strategy for Theorem 1. See Lewbel (2000) for a treatment of omitted variable bias in discrete choice. Remark 1. When the binary choice variables are substitutes, F ε|w can be identified from the data even if η and ε are not independently distributed.
For each W = w, our identification strategy proceeds by first learning the sign of v (w) via Lemma 1. The reason is that for each sign of the interaction effect there are two action profiles, the identity of which are sign dependent, that allow us to recover all the objects of interest. When the choice variables are substitutes, so that v (w) < 0, we use the action profile (0, 0) to recover u 1 (·), u 2 (·) and F ε|W and rely on (1, 1) to identify v (·) and F η|W . When the variables are complements, we use the action profiles (0, 1) and (1, 0) to recover the objects of interest.
We finally show that we can recover part of the model structure without the large support assumption A1. To do so, we replace A2(ii) with a location normalization that is not as sensitive to the tails of the unobservables. The proof of this result builds on Kline (2016) , whose analysis is for a semiparametric two-player game. For each W = w, let u 1 (w), u 2 (w), u 1 (w) + v (w) and u 2 (w) + v (w) all lie in a bounded interval Θ ⊆ R. If the interval varies with w, let Θ be the union of all such w-specific intervals.
Theorem 2. Under the next restrictions, (u
and (IV) η = 1.
A3 : ε | W has an everywhere positive Lebesgue density on its support.
Two-Goods Bundle Model
In this specification of the model, each of the binary variables represents a good. The consumer selects the combination of goods a = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 that maximizes
where u i (W ) − p i + ε i is the quasi-linear utility from consuming good i, p i is the price of the good, and η · v (W ) is the extra utility the consumer gets if she acquires the two goods together. This model is identical to the previous one if we treat prices as the excluded variables.
, identification of the bundles model follows from Theorem 1.
We next cover different uses of our result. Bundling, the strategy of offering two or more products as a specially priced package, is widely used by firms and has been the focus of a large economic literature. Under mixed bundling, in addition to offering the two individual goods, a separate price p 3 is offered for the bundle (1, 1) .
Like in other multinomial choice models, we can compute welfare differences across prices. Let a * (w, p, ε, η) and U * (p) = U (a * , w, p, ε, η) be the optimal choice and maximized utility of a consumer that faces a price vector p. As our structural model can be used to calculate the joint distribution G (U * (p ) , U * (p )) of maximized utilities under prices p and p , we can identify any treatment effect for moving from p to p . For example, the median of
gives the median utility loss in monetary terms of moving from p to p .
Two-Player Game
Consider a binary choice game of complete information. Each player i = 1, 2 chooses an action a i ∈ {0, 1} . A player's payoff from action 0 is normalized to 0, and the payoff of action 1 is
In (2), u i (W ) + Z i + ε i is the standalone value of action 1 and η i · v i (W ) is the effect that the choice of the other player has on player i. Thus, (η 1 , η 2 ) ∈ R 2 + has two dimensions. Finally, Z 1 and Z 2 are excluded variables at the level of each player. In an entry game, Z i might represent the distance between a geographic market and the headquarters of chain i.
A pair a * = (a * 1 , a * 2 ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for w, z and ε 1 , ε 2 , η 1 , η 2 if, for i = 1, 2,
The econometrician observes the distribution of equilibrium choices, Pr (a | w, z), for a crosssection of independent games that share the same structure (
Though this model involves strategic interactions across two agents, its identification is quite similar, in terms of the algebra in the proofs, to the previous model. The proof of Part 1 of Theorem 3 below shows that this is true even if we do not impose an equilibrium selection rule. Part 2 of the theorem shows that the two models are indeed mathematically equivalent if we restrict attention to the class of potential games and use a specific equilibrium selection rule motivated by theoretical and empirical findings.
In game theory, a potential function is a real-valued function defined on the space of pure strategy action profiles of the players such that the change in any player's payoff from a unilateral deviation is equal to the change in the potential function. Potential games are games that admit such a function. Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that our game is a potential game if and only if η 1 · v 1 (W ) = η 2 · v 2 (W ). Letting this term be η · v (W ), it follows by Ui (2000) that the potential function of the game is identical to the overall utility in (1)
we just need to interpret the single agent as a fictitious planner choosing the actions of both players.
The assumption of equal interaction effects is often maintained in the empirical literature when players are anonymous, so that players' indices have no particular meaning. In an entry game, equal interaction effects means that the reduction in profits from monopoly to duopoly is the same for both players.
Potential functions were first used in economic theory to show existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Finite potential games always have a pure strategy equilibrium. In addition, Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that when the game admits a potential function, this function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant. Thus, it offers an equilibrium refinement. Subsequent work studied whether the selection rule based on the potential maximizers is economically meaningful. Lab experiments studying the so-called minimum effort games have shown that observed choices are consistent with the maximization of objects close to the potential function of the game (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1990, Goeree and Holt 2005, and Chen and Chen 2011). These results are remarkable because this class of games often has a large number of equilibria. Further, Ui (2001) shows that if the potential maximizer is unique, then this equilibrium is robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) .
We next provide two sets of identifying conditions: In Part 1 we do not impose an equilibrium selection rule, but we do assume the econometrician knows the sign of the interaction effects. An advantage of the potential game specification (with its associated equilibrium selection rule) in Part 2 is that we can infer the sign of the interaction effects from the data.
Theorem 3. Suppose that A1-3 hold with E (η 1 , η 2 | W ) = (1, 1) instead of A2(III).
1. If, for each W = w, sign(v 1 (w)) = sign(v 2 (w)) and the econometrician knows the sign, then
If, in addition, (η 1 , η 2 ) and ε are independent conditional on W , then F ε|W , F η 1 |W and F η 2 |W are also identified.
and players coordinate on the potential maximizer, then identification of the game follows from Theorem 1.
Remark 2. In Part 1, when the strategic interactions are negative, F ε|w can be identified from the data even if (η 1 , η 2 ) and ε are not conditionally independent. In addition, we can also identify the joint distribution F η 1, η 2 |W .
We next elaborate on the meaning of an equilibrium selection rule based on potential maximizers. When η · v (w) < 0 and the game has multiple equilibria, the equilibrium set is {(0, 1) , (1, 0)}. In this case, (0, 1) maximizes the potential if u 2 (w) + z 2 + ε 2 > u 1 (w) + z 1 + ε 1 , while (1, 0) is the maximizer otherwise. This equilibrium selection rule predicts that the player choosing action 1 is the one with the highest stand-alone value. In an entry game, the most profitable entrant enters in the region where the identity of the entrant is otherwise indeterminate. Alternatively, when η · v (w) > 0 and the game has multiple equilibria, the equilibrium set is {(0, 0) , (1, 1)}. In this case (1, 1) maximizes the potential if
while (0, 0) is the maximizer otherwise. In this second case, the potential maximizer is the less risky equilibrium of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . The lab experiments cited above have shown that the less risky equilibrium is selected even when another equilibrium gives higher payoffs to both players, so that the latter equilibrium Pareto dominates the less risky equilibrium.
Part 1 of Theorem 3 gives identification results for the binary game without imposing an equilibrium selection rule. Instead, the researcher needs to know the sign of the interaction effects. There are many games where theoretical arguments are compatible with both negative and positive interaction effects (e.g., the crimes model of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2006). In these cases, the potential specification coupled with the selection rule based on potential maximizers offers an alternative identification strategy.
Recovering the structure of the game point identifies counterfactuals involving a known equilibrium selection rule and set identifies counterfactuals that do not impose an equilibrium selection rule. We can evaluate the impact on equilibrium choices of changing the equilibrium selection rule. In a coordination game, this could help us to estimate how much the players are losing by not coordinating on the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Also, we can examine the impact on action profile probabilities from altering the underlying matching process across players by increasing the correlation in the joint distribution of observables or unobservables, while keeping their marginals fixed -e.g., we could predict choices under assortative matching (Graham, Imbens and Ridder 2014 study a similar exercise). Finally, as explained before for bundles, discrete choice models can be used to calculate quantiles of welfare differences across different values of the explanatory variables W, Z. These true counterfactuals or welfare estimates require knowledge of the entire structure of the game and not just the choice probabilities in the data, Pr (a | w, z).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We first show that, for each W = w, the sign of η · v (w) has different observable implications. We then recover the sign of the interaction effect. Section B of the online appendix reviews some of the concepts we use in this proof.
Step 1 If η · v (w) ≥ 0, U (a, w, z, ε, η) is supermodular in (a 1 , a 2 ). In addition, it has increasing differences in both (a 1 , z 1 ) and (a 2 , z 1 ). By A3, the maximizer is unique with probability 1. Let
It follows by Topkis' theorem that a * (w, z, ε, η) increases (in the coordinatewise order) in z 1 with probability 1. By A2(i), the unobservables ε, η are independent of z 1 . Thus, for all z 1 > z 1 and every upper set U in {0, 1} 2 , we have that
That is, the random vector a * (w, z, ε, η) | w, z 1 , z 2 increases with respect to first order stochastic dominance in z 1 . Because stochastic dominance is preserved under marginalization, in the data, Pr (a 2 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) increases in z 1 (Müller and Stoyan 2002, Theorem 3.3.10, p. 94) . Similarly, we can show that Pr (a 1 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) increases in z 2 .
Step 2 If η · v (w) ≤ 0, U (a, w, z, ε, η) is supermodular in (a 1 , −a 2 ). In addition, U (a, w, z, ε, η) has increasing differences in both (a 1 , z 1 ) and (−a 2 , z 1 ). By A3, the maximizer is unique with probability 1. Then, by Topkis' theorem, (a * 1 (w, z, ε, η) , −a * 2 (w, z, ε, η)) increases in z 1 with probability 1. Following similar arguments to those in Step 1, we get that Pr (a 2 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) decreases in z 1 . Similarly, Pr (a 1 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) decreases in z 2 .
Step 3 By A3, if η · v (w) = 0, then Pr (a 2 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) and Pr (a 1 = 1 | w, z 1 , z 2 ) are not constant as functions of z 1 and z 2 . It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that, for each W = w, the sign of η · v (w) is identified from available data.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This proof relies on the sign of the interaction effect that we can recover using Lemma 1. It also relies on three key results regarding characteristic functions (ϕ). Let ε 1 , ε 2 , η be three random variables. In addition, let us assume that ε 1 and ε 2 are, separately, independent of η. Then, for each θ, θ 1 , θ 2 ≥ 0, the next three equalities hold Define α = (α 1 , α 2 ) ≡ (ε 1 + u 1 (w) , ε 2 + u 2 (w)) . By A2(i), the vector (ε 1 , ε 2 , η) and hence ε are independent of Z. For an arbitrary point of evaluation α = (α 1 , α 2 ), we have
for excluded variable choices z 1 = −α 1 and z 2 = −α 2 . Therefore, the variation in Z from A1 and Pr ((0, 0) | w, z) identifies the CDF of α, for each W = w.
Under A3, the probability of selecting both items is
Because η · v (w) ≤ 0, the first inequality above is implied by the last two. Thus,
. Given A2(i) and using the previous logic, we can use variation in Z and Pr ((1, 1) | w, z) to get F β|w . By A2(ii) and A2(iii), ε and η have mean (0, 0) and 1, respectively, conditional on W = w. Thus,
One can see that (u i ) i≤2 , v is identified for W = w.
Once (u i ) i≤2 , v is identified, we can obtain the distribution of (ε 1 , ε 2 ) from the one of α using a simple location shift. Therefore, we identify F ε|W . Likewise, we can move from the distribution of β | W = w to the distribution of (−ε 1 − η · v (w) , −ε 2 − η · v (w)) and, by a known multiplicative change of variables, the distribution of (ε 1 + η · v (w) , ε 2 + η · v (w)). Assuming that η and ε are independent conditional on W , F η·v(w)|w is identified from knowledge of F ε|w , given the second result we mentioned above for characteristic functions. Finally, a known, multiplicative change of variables, given that v (w) is known, identifies F η|w .
Complements (η · v (w) ≥ 0) Under A3, the probability of selecting only binary variable 1 is
Because η · v (w) ≥ 0, the third inequality above is implied by the first two. Thus,
is independent of Z. Thus, for an arbitrary point of evaluation α = (α 1 , α 2 ) of the CDF F α|w ,
for choices z 1 = α 1 and z 2 = −α 2 . Therefore, the variation in Z from A1 and Pr ((1, 0) | w, z) identifies the CDF of α, for each W = w. Applying the same logic, we can use variation in Z and Pr ((0, 1) | w, z) to recover F β|w , where the random vector β is β = (β 1 , β 2 ) ≡ (ε 1 + u 1 (w) + η · v (w) , −ε 2 − u 2 (w)) . By A2(ii) and A2(iii), ε has (0, 0) mean and η has a mean of 1 conditional on W = w. Therefore,
One can see that u 1 , u 2 and v are identified for this W = w.
Once (u i ) i≤2 , v is identified we can recover, using a multiplicative change of variables, the distribution of (ε 1 , ε 2 + η · v (w)) from the distribution of α. Therefore we can also identify the distribution of ε 2 + η · v (w). In addition, we can recover, using a multiplicative change of variables, the distribution of (ε 1 + η · v (w) , ε 2 ) from the distribution of β. Thus we can also identify the distribution of ε 2 . Knowing the distributions of ε 2 + η · v (w) and ε 2 , we can use the first result we mentioned above for characteristic functions to identify F η·v(w)|w . As before, a known, multiplicative change of variables, given that v (w) is known, identifies F η|w .
Finally, given that we know the distributions of (ε 1 , ε 2 + η · v (w)) and η · v (w), we can use the third result we mentioned above for characteristic functions to recover F ε|W .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
This proof relies on the sign of the interaction effect, which is identified by Lemma 1.
Substitutes (η · v (w) ≤ 0) Under A3 , given the proof of Theorem 1, Pr ((0, 0) | w, z) = Pr (ε 1 + u 1 (w) ≤ −z 1 , ε 2 + u 2 (w) ≤ −z 2 | w, z) .
By A2 (iii), we can get the density f of F ε 1 +u 1 (w),ε 2 +u 2 (w)|W (in the support of Z) as follows Submodular Game (η 1 · v 1 (w) ≤ 0 and η 2 · v 2 (w) ≤ 0) Under A3, when the game is submodular and (0, 0) is an equilibrium, it is unique (e.g., Tamer 2003 ). The same is true regarding (1, 1) . The probability that both players choose action 0, Pr ((0, 0) | w, z), is identical to the probability of selecting (0, 0) when the binary variables are substitutes. In addition, the probability that both players choose action 1 simplifies to Pr ((1, 1) | w, z) = Pr (ε 1 + u 1 (w) + η 1 · v 1 (w) ≥ −z 1 , ε 2 + u 2 (w) + η 2 · v 2 (w) ≥ −z 2 | w, z) .
This expression differs from the probability of selecting (1, 1) in the proof of Theorem 1 in that we have η 1 · v 1 (w) and η 2 · v 2 (w) instead of just η · v (w) . Given the independent variation of Z 1 and Z 2 , the extra term does not introduce any difficulty in the identification strategy.
Supermodular Game (η 1 · v 1 (w) ≥ 0 and η 2 · v 2 (w) ≥ 0) Under A3, when (1, 0) is an equilibrium, with probability 1 it is unique (e.g., Tamer 2003) . The probability that player 1 selects action 1 and player 2 action 0 simplifies to Pr ((1, 0) | w, z) = Pr (−ε 1 − u 1 (w) ≤ z 1 , ε 2 + u 2 (w) + η 2 · v 2 (w) ≤ −z 2 | w, z) .
This expression differs from the probability of selecting only the first variable in the proof of Theorem 1 in that now we have η 2 · v 2 (w) instead of η · v (w) . It follows by simple inspection that this difference does not introduce any additional difficulty in the identification strategy, except for the fact that we need to use a slightly different property of characteristic functions for independent variables, namely, ϕ ε 1 +η 1 ,ε 2 +η 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) = ϕ ε 1 ,ε 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) ϕ η 1 ,η 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) .
